Introduction
It has long been recognized that the distribution of income in an economy may, to a large extent, depend on political factors. More specifically, a natural hypothesis is that a more egalitarian distribution of political rights in the form of a political democracy should be accompanied by a more equal income distribution. Indeed, this hypothesis has a celebrated tradition in social sciences (Lipset,1959 , Lenski, 1966 , Meltzer and Richard, 1981 . Empirical research testing this hypothesis has also loomed large. Political scientists, economists, and sociologists alike have devoted a great deal of energies arguing whether or not the hypothesis holds. The existing evidence, however, does not find any robust relationship between democracy and inequality in a cross-country regression analysis. Thus, Bollen and Jackman, 1985 , fail to detect such a relationship; Li et al., 1998 , find some limited support for a negative relationship between democracy and inequality; Rodrik, 1999 , presents evidence that democracy is associated with a higher share of wages in GDP and thus lower inequality.' Indeed, a casual inspection of recent events in East Europe as well as in East Asia casts doubts that any such simple relationship may exist. It has been argued that, in the East European countries, democratization of the 90's actually resulted in an increase in income inequality -for the review of findings supporting this claim see Fleming and Micklewright, 2000 . Similarly, some of the East Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore have had among the most egalitarian income distributions in the world, yet their political record is far from democratic.
These observations lead us to consider additional factors, which may affect income inequality alongside democracy. A clue in the search for such factors is provided 2 by the experience of the East European countries under the communist regime. There is little doubt that in this era, the political rights' record in these countries was especially miserable. Yet, the distribution of income was quite egalitarian, especially when compared with other countries with similar per capita income levels. This is most likely true even when one takes into account the fact that income was derived from non-market transactions, that some of it was given in kind, and a substantial portion of income was in fact determined by a person's status (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992 , Milanovic, 1998 , and the review of Fleming and Micklewright, 2000) .
One reason for this could be that the prevailing political ideology of these countries was deeply rooted in the egalitarian tradition. To be sure, differences in political power as well as in social status existed and were at least as powerful as everywhere else, bul income differences were not much approved by the populace.
Ostentatious display of the rich was frowned upon and very uncommon; modest material life and the ability to make ends meet with little means were praised. This may imply that in a cross-country comparison, ideology needs to be taken into consideration when examining income distribution and its relationship to democracy.
While the concepts of political culture and ideology have been controversial and elusive in the social sciences, they seem too important to be neglected altogether.
Cultural values may play an important role in shaping policies and the resulting crosscountry differences in economic outcomes may to a large extent hinge on different ideologies. Indeed, a substantial body of political literature exists (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963, and Abramson and Inglehart, 1996) which emphasizes the relationship between culture and ideology on the one hand and political economic institutions on the 3 other hand. More specifically, Granato et al., 1996 , studies how the former may affect economic development; 2 Gradstein and Justman, 2000 , investigate the socializing role of education and its effect on the efficiency of resource allocation; Bisin and Verdier, 2000, offer a dynamic evolutionary model of cultural transmission. This paper is an attempt to employ the insights derived from that literature to study the effect of democracy on income inequality. We stipulate that the outcome of redistribution, and hence inequality, hinges on the details of the political process: when it is democratized, the resulting level of income inequality is expected to be lower than when it is controlled by a rich oligarchy. But it also depends on the society's predisposition towards equity: if equity is valuable in itself, then even the rich oligarchy will avoid extreme inequality. This implies that democratization process in societies which value equity will result in only marginal further reduction in inequality. This is in contrast to societies for which equity in itself is immaterial, and where transition of political power to the majority results in much more aggressive redistribution and inequality reduction.
This view of the effect of democracy on inequality through the prism of ideology is tested in the empirical part of the paper. Over the last decades, several reasonable measures of the degree to which countries are democratic have been generated. A subset of these measures is used in this paper. For inequality we use the high quality Gini data set compiled by World Institute of Development Economics Research (WIDER, 1999) .
While a proxy for ideology may be difficult to construe, as a first approximation we use the dominant religion in a country, whereas the predominantly atheist post communist countries form a separate category. 3 Our analysis of unbalanced panel data for the period 4 1960-98 and 126 countries provides support for the hypothesis that ideological factors are important determinants of income inequality. While in certain countries, mostly in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the expansion of democracy is likely to result in substantial inequality reduction, in other countries (Buddhist/Hindu, Confucian, Communist) such effect is negligible or absent altogether. These findings are obtained even when controlling for other variables, which traditionally have been thought as affecting inequality. Another, surprising, finding of this paper is the different impact of political institutions on the relationship between democracy and inequality. Specifically, we present evidence that the negative relationship between democracy and inequality is more likely to hold-for a given level of democracy-in countries with parliamentary rather than presidential system. Although this finding was not anticipated by the empirical design, we consider it to be interesting enough to be reported here.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes a very simple theoretical framework and its analysis; section 3 presents the data to be used for the empirical part, the analysis of which is undertaken in section 4; finally, section 5 closes with brief concluding remarks.
Theoretical framework

Description of the economy
The model economy consists of a finite but large number of agents indexed by i =1,..,N.
The agents are initially endowed with an exogenously given income yio. The distribution of initial income in the population is assumed to be skewed, so that the median income YmO lies below its mean Y 0 , and we let F denote the cdf of income. All individuals share 5 identical preferences. These are derived over an individual's income ex post taxes and transfers, as well as over the. distribution of this income across the individuals in the economy. Letting y,I denote individual i's ex post income, we write his overall utility as: (y 11 , . ., YNI) ( 1) where both U and W are continuous, U is monotonic and concave and W is symmetric and quasiconcave.
Note that the first term in the above expression is the utility from own income, whereas the second term represents the utility an individual derives from income distribution in the population. The assumptions on W guarantee that it captures preference for equality in the sense that its value increases as a result of an equalizing transfer from a richer to a poorer individual -see Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1973 . It will be convenient to relate W to a standard inequality measure, such as the Gini coefficient, or a coefficient of variation and to think of utility as a linear combination between own income and such inequality measure; this then would allow us to write individual utility as:
Yjl -a I (AYI,. .., YNI) (1') where a > 0 is interpreted as the parameter related to disutility from income inequality, called equality preference, and I is the inequality measure.
The above depicted economy is a special case of the one considered in, for example, Arrow, 1983 , Becker, 1974 , and Hochman and Rodgers, 1969 . Existence of the second term in the utility specification implies that the individuals may want to voluntary transfer part of their initial endowment in order to decrease income inequality. As is shown in Arrow, 1983 , however, the amount of voluntary transfers is typically inefficient because of the free riding effect: every giver hopes that the additional transfers will be 6 made by the other potential givers, hence not enough income will be transferred. 4 The implication of this argument in the present context is that, typically, the equilibrium income inequality is excessively high. 5
Alternatively, income redistribution could also be implemented through a formal redistribution mechanism. Following the long-standing tradition in the literature (see e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981 , and the survey in Persson and Tabellini, 1999 , part I), we assume that this is given by a combination of a proportional income tax and a lump-sum transfer. In addition, we assume that such redistribution is associated with a deadweight loss. The deadweight loss may stem from adverse labor supply effects, or from the hindering of innovative activity. Specifically, let t denote the income tax rate. The 
yi,=(I-t)y0o y (t-B(t)) Yo
Note that Y 1 = (1 -B(t))Yo, so that implementation of this redistribution mechanism results in average income loss, whose magnitude is positively related to the tax rate.
The tax rate is chosen by a majority of votes. We assume that the population of voters consists of all individuals whose income exceeds a minimal threshold y: the lower is the threshold the more democratic the society is, as it allows a larger fraction of the population to be enfranchised. Yo, ..., YNO + (t-B(t) )Yo) the indirect utility from a more equal income distribution as a function of the tax rate. 7
Finally, we denote I(t) = I((J-t) ylo + (t-B(t))
Analysis
In order to characterize the voting equilibrium of this mechanism, we first turn to the optimal tax rate from the viewpoint of voter i. The interior optimal tax rate is determined from the following FOC:
Differentiation reveals that the second order conditions are satisfied provided that d 2 IIdt 2 2 0, which holds true for such inequality measures as the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation. 6 Thus, individual preferences are single peaked, and a majority voting equilibrium exists.
Differentiating (3) with respect to initial income yio, we obtain, given the assumptions,
Thus, the preferred tax rate is a decreasing function of income implying that the politically decisive voter is the one with the median income among the voters.
Differentiation of (3) with respect to a reveals that the higher the equality preference the higher is the chosen tax rate. Moreover, differentiating (4) with respect to a we obtain that d2t/dy 1 oda > 0, implying that the greater is the equality preference, the less steep is the negative relationship between income and the preferred tax rate, i.e., the more willing are the rich to bear high taxes.
The implicit characterization of the interior equilibrium tax rate is as follows:
where ydo denotes the income level of the decisive voter, which has the median income in the voters' population. The tax rate chosen by the median voter is the one that optimally 8 balances reduction in inequality and the deadweight loss of taxation; clearly, the equilibrium tax rate is an increasing function of the median voter's income. Now, democratization enfranchises some of the poor, lowering the minimal franchise requirement, y. As a result, political power is shifted to a poorer coalition of voters, so that a poorer voter becomes decisive (Ydo in (5) is decreased), which in turn results in a higher tax rate and a lower level of inequality (this is why the slope of the line in Figure 1 must be negative). As we have seen, this effect is weaker when there is concern for equality, so that a is large (which means that line BB in Figure 1 must throughout the whole range lie above the line AA and be flatter). The implication is that, when democratization is enhanced, its inequality reducing effect may be difficult to detect because of the intervening factor of the social norm of inequality intolerance. The implication is that, when democratization is enhanced, its inequality reducing effect may be difficult to detect because of the intervening factor of the social norm of inequality intolerance.
Summing up, Proposition 1. Under formal redistribution, democratization results in higher taxes and transfers, hence in lower inequality. This effect is stronger when under the prevailing ideology concern for equality is small and is weaker when such concern is substantial. We now turn to the empirical test of the hypothesis summarized in the above Proposition, beginning with the description of the data -the variables and the sample -and then proceeding with the estimation.
The data
Variables
As argued in the previous part, the effect of democracy on inequality is mediated through prevailing ideology. We approximate ideology by dominant religion except in the case of The two variables we use are the extent of democracy (Dem) and openness of the political system or party competitiveness (Parcomp). Dem defined as "general openness of political institutions" ranges from 0 to 10; parcomp, defined as "extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political expression" ranges from 0 to 5 (definitions taken from the codebook of Polity database by Jaggers [1996110) . Values of both variables increase as level of democracy and political openness increase. The advantage of the Polity98D is that it provides a long series of data stretching in some cases back to the 19th century. The disadvantage, a serious one, is lack of transparency in how the scores are calculated. While the authors mention a number of checkpoints which they follow, they are very broad so that it very unclear how, in practice, they are instrumentalized, and the judgments are, of course, subjective."' The problem with Polity database is that there are neither objective criteria used for measuring democracy, nor can a user see and check for himself how the authors have arrived to their judgments. Basically, one needs to accept the authors' judgments on faith.
These drawbacks are remedied by the newly created Database of Political Institutions (DPI), which is explained and discussed in Beck et al. (2000) . We use three variables from DPI. They are type of political system (System) which ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 indicating a presidential system, 1 assembly-elected president, and 2 a parliamentary system. Two points are important to underscore with respect to this 
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The second DPI variable we use is Executive Index of Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC) index. The index ranges from 1 to 7, with competitively elected presidents or prime ministers depending on who is assigned the Chief Executive title (e.g., in the US, it would be president, in the UK, it would be prime minister) getting 6 or 7. For example, candidates scores 4; if multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats (like in many Arab countries), the score is 5; if some parties had won seats but the largest party received more than 75 percent of all seats, the score is 6; and finally, if there are multiple parties and none holds more than 75 percent of all seats, the score is 7. In addition to these five measures of democracy, we also create two interacted variables, by interacting respectively EIEC and LIEC with the political system.
The last control variable we use is the level of economic development which we approximate by GDP per capita expressed in international dollars of equal purchasing power parity (PPP). The benchmark year is 1995 for which we have the actual $PPP levels for more than 100 countries. 12 We then use real GDP changes to derive the GDPPPP levels in the previous years going all the way to 1960. Thus all the GDP per capita data are expressed in PPP levels using the international prices of the year 1995.
Most of the data are obtained from the on-line World Bank data base (called SIMA),
while for some countries-mostly transition economies, and in particular the former republics of the USSR-we had to calculate their real per capita growth rate using the All currently existing countries (year 2000) are "projected back" into the past. We mean by that that individual data are collected for all former USSR republics, for the Czech republic and Slovakia separately, for all five successor states of the former Yugoslavia, and for Pakistan and Bangladesh (until 1972, East Pakistan) .' 9 For all the "current" countries (formerly republics/parts of larger entities), we use the republican GDP's, population, or Gini coefficients. The political variables for each of the republics are often, but not always, the same as for the entire country where they belonged.
While the GDPPPP data vary a lot in time, the variability is less for the political variables, either in Polity98D or DPI database. However, they too are time-variant as shown in Tables 2 and 3 on the example of Dem variable from Polity98D, and EIEC from the DPI database. We see from the last columns in Table 2 that only the least democratic (value 0) and the most democratic (value 10) observations tend to stay in the same group:
conditional on having democracy level 0 or 10, respectively 66 and almost 70 percent of cases (or time) such countries remain in the same group. The constancy of the other levels of democracy is much less (between 11 and 23 percent). The same regularity is observed for EIEC: the stability of political arrangements is the greatest at the extremes. 64 percent of the time, countries where the chief executive is elected by a party congress or by referendum or "popular acclamation" stay in the same category; 52 percent of time, countries whose chief executive is competitively elected and gets less than 75 percent of the vote, remain in the same group. The situation, however, is very different as far as religious variables are concerned.
That variable itself is much more sluggish since religious composition of population does not change fast. Practically, the only source of variability is the change from Communist to whatever the dominant religious affiliation may be in the case of countries that have abandoned Communism. Note: Number of countries shows all countries that have, at least once, had a given religion. Thus, for example, if a country changes from Communism to Orthodoxy, the country would be included in both groups (Communism and Orthodoxy). This explains why there are 147 countries in the sample, and why the percentage column gives 116.7 percent.
Empirical estimation
Methodology
We use the following specification:
GINIJ, = fct(GDPi,t; DEMi t ; IDEOLOGY; IDEOLOGY * DEMti)
where subscript i refers to country and t to year (from 1960 to 1998). In the empirical estimation, GDP per capita expressed in the 1995 dollars of equal purchasing parity (PPP) enters both linearly and squared, as is conventionally done to reflect some Kuznets-type movement of inequality. Democracy (DEM) is approximated by the five variables described above. The IDEOLOGY dummies test for the possibility, explained earlier, that some ideologies may be more sensitive to equality than others. Finally, the interaction between ideology and democracy tests for our hypothesis (Proposition 1) that democracy may exert a differential impact on inequality depending on the prevailing religious/political affiliation of the country. In other words we posit that the effect of religion or ideology on inequality is exerted through two channels: directly (as reflected in the ideology dummies) and through differential effect of democracy on inequality depending on the religious-ideological context within which democratization occurs.
We expect the, effect of GDP per capita to be of the usual inverted-U shape, the impact of democracy to be negative, while the coefficients on the IDEOLOGY dummies and the interaction term between ideology and democracy are not determined on an a priori basis.
The data are an unbalanced panel covering 38 years and 126 countries, primarily because of unevenly spaced observations on the Gini coefficient. IDEOLOGY (religion) 20 is clearly exogeneous. While the effect of inequality on growth has recently been hotly debated, with arguments put forward that the effect is both positive and negative (for an excellent review of the literature and testing of the hypotheses, see Perotti, 1996) , the influence of inequality on GDP levels is unlikely, so that reverse causality is not a problem. Reverse causation can, however, be a problem with the DEMOCRACY variable. Inequality can influence the level of democracy, and we address this problem by lagging DEMOCRACY. The use of lagged DEMOCRACY, however, is not only an econometric expedient. It has a substantive role too. It is reasonable to assume that the effect of democracy on inequality, if any, is unlikely to be instantaneous. While political changes can be fast (a country can move swiftly from a, dictatorship to a democracy, and perhaps within a relatively short time span from democracy to dictatorship), they are unlikely to immediately affect the relatively stable economic forces which underlie inequality. This is why in addition to one-period (one-year) lagged democracy, we also use the average of the DEMOCRACY values for years t-l to t-3. 2 0
We also need to control for country effects. Without this adjustment it is quite conceivable, for example, that what is retrieved as a religious effect is in reality a country effect. This may be particularly a problem for religious practices that exist in only a few countries. For example, is relatively low inequality in Taiwan due to ideological preferences for equality, or to the fact that a successful agrarian reform and privatization were conducted in the 1950's which in turn, derive from the past of Japanese occupation and the Communist threat from the Mainland? All regressions therefore include country dummies.
Effect of democracy
The first four columns in Tables 5 and 6 show the results of estimating equation 1 with four formulations of the DEMOCRACY variables; the next two columns include interaction of DEMOCRACY with the system variable. 21 Table 5 presents the results using a one-year lag formulation for DEMOCRACY, while in Table 6 we use the average value of DEMOCRACY during the three previous years. As expected, the effect of democracy is negative in all formulations but is not statistically significant (at 5 percent level) anywhere. However, the significance is almost always stronger when we use the three-year lagged formulation. This conforms with Muller, 1988 , who similarly finds that the stability of democracy is a better predictor of inequality that the one time level of democracy.
However, democracy may affect inequality not only directly but through the type of political system. In other words, democracy in a parliamentary system may have a different impact on inequality than democracy in a presidential system. The former is closer to a direct democracy and, by giving a greater role to the political parties and formation of coalition governments, may stimulate redistributionist policies of the type that we generally associate with the median voter behavior. The effect of a democratic presidential system on inequality is more difficult to gauge on an a priori ground. A strong president, once elected, is not subject to the day-to-day "control" of the political parties, and ultimately, voters which is a key characteristic of parliamentary regimes.
President can thus pursue a wider range of distributional policies; in some cases, he/she may opt for policies that increase (e.g. Salinas in Mexico), and in other cases, for policies that reduce (e.g. Chavez in Venezuela) inequality. To account for the political system, we 22 interact political system (system variable from DPI) with competitiveness in election for the executive office and legislature (respectively EIEC and LIEC). The results are shown in columns 5 and 6 (Tables 5 and 6 ). We see that the parliamentary and the mixed system (strong president elected by parliament) are associated with reduced inequality compared to the presidential system. This effect is particularly strong and significant when we interact the type of polical system with competitivness in the election for the executive office: the Gini coefficient is some 0.3 points less, controlling for the level of democracy.
We also interact each year during which country is in transition from Communism (that is, all years after 1990 for all formerly Communist countries) with democracy in order to sweep the already-noted paradoxical effect (see Gradstein and Milanovic, 2000) of post-Communist transition during which increase in democracy was associated with increase in inequalit). The coefficient is always positive, and in 11 out of 12 cases statistically significant with various (Polity-or DPI-measured) improvements in democracy adding beWween 1 and 3 Gini points.
We conclude that the effect of democracy on inequality is negative but very weak.
It becomes statistically more significant when we assess country's democracy by looking at its level over a longer (three-year) time period. With one-year lag, the effect of democracy almost vanishes. In addition, democracy reduces inequality more in parliamentary and mixed systems than in presidential systems, while during the transition from Communism, democratization is associated with increased inequality. Note: P-values between brackets (if P<0.05 shaded). The omitted ideology is Catholic (both as the dummy, and in the interaction between democracy and religion); omitted system is presidential. The omitted country is Mexico which was Catholic and presidential throughout the entire period. Coefficients for country dummies not shown. Note: P-values between brackets (if P<0.05 shaded). The omitted ideology is Catholic (both as the dummy, and in the interaction between democracy and religion); omitted system is presidential. The omitted country is Mexico which was Catholic and presidential throughout the entire period. Coefficients for country dummies not shown.
Effect of religion
Countries with Muslim, Confucian and Buddhist/Hindu ideology consistently show, both in Tables 5 and 6 , a statistically significant lower inequality that Catholic countries (Catholicism, the most represented religion in terms of countries, is the omitted category).
Since we do not know what really explains lower inequality in these societies, we call them "intrinsically more equal" (than Catholic), using "intrinsic" as a technical term, and implying thereby that there are certain preferences for equality which may be due to the differences in family formation (fewer nuclear households) or to greater informal transfers-points raised in Section 1 above.
Looking at Table 5 and 6 results, the intercept (dunmmy variable) shows that the inequality reducing effect of Islam-which is the most consistent and statistically significant throughout-amounts to between 10 and 14 Gini points; the effect of Confucianism which is also statistically significant in all but one case ranges between -14 and -25 Gini points, while the effect of Buddhism/Hinduism is between -11 and -14
Gini points. Communism too shows a statistically significant negative effect in four regressions. At the other end of the spectrum, countries without a dominant religion (Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Trinidad and Tobago) consistently display greater intrinsic inequality (the dummy variable is statistically significant in almost all formulations both in Tables 5 and   6 ). Protestant countries and the "new" Christian countries also show, in some instances, a positive coefficient on the dummy variable. The intercept term for all other religions does not differ from the one for the Catholic countries. The implication of our finding is that Muslim and Confucian societies very strongly, and somewhat more tentatively .
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Buddhist/Hindu, and Communist societies, exhibit certain features, independent of whether they are democratic or not, which make then more equal than other societies. This effect has been, in some previous empirical work on inequality, established for Communist societies (Kaelble and Thomas, 1991; Ahluwalia, 1976; Milanovic 1996) but not for the other three.
Interaction between democracy and religion
It is also possible that ideology exerts an impact on inequality indirectly, that is in "determining" how a given level of democracy is "translated" (reflected) on inequality.
This effect comes in addition to the direct effect captured by the religion dummies. To account for it, we interact religion dummy variables with democracy. We thus allow for religion to affect both the intercept and the slope coefficients.
The results here somewhat vary between the two regressions. With a one-year lagged DEMOCRACY, only Confucianism and Communism show a positive (inequality increasing) effect of democracy (in at least two formulations out of six). The result for Communism is not unexpected because greater political liberalization in Communist countries in Eastern Europe (up to 1990), and in contemporary China and Vietnam, was accompanied by economic liberalization and increased income differences. Thus a combination of intrinsic inequality-reducing effect of Communism (as reflected in the intercept term), and increasing inequality with democratization makes intuitive sense. On the other hand, the group of Christian mixed societies composed of Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands shows a very strong inequality-reducing effect of democracy present in all formulations (see Table 5 ). Nations with mixed religion too 31 show that democracy reduces inequality: this effect is both strong and present in all the formulations. For example, a one standard deviation increase in Polity98D democracy index (equivalent to an improvement from the level of Armenia to that of Australia, both in 1998), reduces on average the Gini coefficient in mixed-religion societies by 5.6 points; similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the EIEC index (equivalent to an improvement from Vietnam to Zimbabwe in 1997), reduces the Gini coefficient by 3.6 points. Other religions show no statistically significant effect in more than one case. 22 When we approximate DEMOCRACY using its three-year average value, the number of religions with inequality-increasing effect of democracy goes up. In addition to Confucian and Communist countries, there is now a strong evidence of a positive relationship for Buddhist/Hindu societies, and somewhat weaker evidence for "New"
Christian and Orthodox countries. On the other side of the spectrum, the group of Christian mixed/Judiasm and countries without a dominant religion is joined by countries where Protestantism is the dominant religion. They exhibit the same inequality reducing effect, although it is not statistically significant in all the formulations. Table 7 summarizes the effect of religion on inequality, by combining the "intrinsic" effect of religion on inequality, and the additional effect working through the interaction term. For the effect to be deemed significant, we request that the sign of the coefficient be the same (positive or negative) throughout all the formulations of the regression, and that it be statistically significant at the 5 percent level in at least two cases out of six. show that while the effect of increased democracy on inequality is positive, they apparently have other "intrinsic equalizers" independent of democracy which reduce inequality. The same "intrinsic equalizers" are very strongly present in Muslim societies too. Therefore, more equality seems, in the Judeo-Christian context, and this particularly in Protestant and mixed Christian societies, to be achieved through democracy, and presumably, the ability which democracy gives to poorer segments of society to redistribute some income (via government transfers and taxes) away from the rich. 23 In the other societies (Muslim, Buddhist/Hindu, Confucian and Communist), the effect of democratization on inequality is small or even positive, but inequality is reduced, we surnise, through other tools like religious alms, broadly provided state-sector employment, private transfers between the generations, and generally stronger family, and perhaps ethnic, ties. Whether such societies are democratic or not does not seem to matter, as far as equality is concerned.
Third, an interesting case is offered by societies without a dominant religion. These are in all but two cases (Fiji, and Trinidad and Tobago) African nations where traditional African beliefs, Christianity and Islam each appeal to a broad segment of the population.
These religiously fragmented societies seem to possess certain features that make them intrinsically more unequal than other societies. However, on a positive note, democracy there is very strongly associated with reduced inequality, the way it is associated in mixed Christian and Protestant nations. Thus, democracy, in addition to its positive freedom-expanding effect, may also exert a desirable effect on inequality. To the extent that inequality stimulates inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict, one may speculate that democracy in such fractious settings may be a good tool for lessening inequalities and thus the underlying tensions. 2 4
Conclusion
In conclusion, we find that it is not democracy per se that matters for inequality-in fact, its direct net effect appears quite weak. Our findings suggest rather that democratization affects inequality indirectly.
First, through the social context and societal values within which it takes place. For the Judeo-Christian societies, democratization is generally associated with reduction in inequality. For Muslim, Buddhist/Hindu and Confucian societies, democracy has either hardly discernible, or even a positive, effect on inequality. Yet these societies seem to possess some features which make them intrinsically more equal than the Judeo-Christian societies. It could be -although our empirical test does not account for that -that, the same "desired" level of inequality which in the Judeo-Christian societies is achieved through expanded franchise and government-sponsored redistribution, is implemented in the Muslem, Buddhist/Hindu, and Confucian societies informally, through family and ethnic ties.
Second, our empirical analysis indicates that democracy "works" through the type of political system: controlling for the level of democracy, parliamentary systems are more likely to generate lower inequality than presidential systems. While this aspect was not perceived by us as the main motivation for pursuing this work, the robustness of the finding begs further empirical analysis and the development of theoretical foundations for the study of the effect of political institutions on inequality. ' See Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990 , for a survey of earlier literature There also exists a related literature, which examines the reverse causal link, from inequality to democracy, see Boix, 2000 , and references therein. While this paper generally abstracts from this direction, the empirical analysis below takes the possibility of such reverse link into account.
APPENDIX: RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE COUNTRIES
